

DNSSEC Tutorial: Status Today



Phil Regnault
Hervey Allen

26 February 2009
Manila, Philippines



<http://nsrc.org/tutorials/2009/apricot/dnssec/>

DNSSEC: Current Status

Who's signed their zones?

- .bg (Bulgaria)
- .br (Brazil)
- .com (“by 2011” according to Verisign)
- .cz (Czech Republic)
- .gov (is close)
- .museum
- .org (is close)
- .pr (Puerto Rico)
- .se (Sweden)
- Serveral IDN-based TLDs
 - <https://itar.iana.org/>

DNSSEC: Current Status cont.

Who's signed their zones?

- Anyone else?

Lots of second-level domains (.org.br, etc.). *Islands of trust*. Their *trust anchors* are their TLD (if signed), else a DLV, other signed zone, etc...

DNSSEC: Current Status US Government NOI

The US Government's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) asked for Public Comments Regarding the Deployment of DNSSEC (i.e. *signing the root!*):

- <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/DNS/dnssec.html>
- Press release went out 9 October 2008 with comments due by 24 November 2008.
- See the "NOI Supporting Material" section for the various DNSSEC proposals under consideration.
- Read the comments. Interesting and from many parties, including many "Internet and DNSSEC Celebrities".
- By November 24, there were 55 comments (many very long) received.
- Currently "under consideration" by the US Government, but currently awaiting approval of new Secretary of Commerce nomination (Gary Locke, nominated 25 Feb. 2009).

DNSSEC Status Conclusion

- Multiple methods currently available to use DNSSEC, but nothing is optimal until the *root* (.) is signed.
- TLDs can use IANA's ITAR.
- Second-Level domains can use their ccTLD, if signed, or ISC's DLV, or other trust anchors.

Kaminsky exploit makes DNSSEC deployment inevitable... Critical...