Network Security: The Principles of Threats, Attacks and Intrusions (Part 1)

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Contents

Background to security risks and the Internet ■ TCP/IP vulnerabilities Attack Trends Classification of attacks Social Engineering Hacking or Cracking ■ Viruses and Worms Blended Attacks Trojan Horses Network Layer Attacks - spoofing, hijacking (Distributed) Denial of Service Attacks

Live tests reported in "Cryptogram" (B. Schneier) www.counterpane.com

- A random computer on the Internet is scanned dozens of times a day
- The life expectancy of a default installation of Red Hat 6.2 server, or the time before someone successfully hacks it, is less than 72 hours
- A Windows home user with file sharing enabled, was hacked five times in four days
- Systems are subjected to NetBIOS scans an average of 17 times a day
- The fastest time for a server being hacked: 15 minutes after plugging it into the network

Quote from Kevin Mitnick

"It's naive to assume that just installing a firewall is going to protect you from all potential security threats. That assumption creates a false sense of security which can be worse than having no security at all."

Security and the Internet

- Between February 2000 and December 2001 we have seen....
- The biggest Denial of Service Attack in the history of computing (7-11 February 2000)
- The biggest Virus Attack in the history of computing ("I Love You", 4 May 2000)
- The biggest Worm Attack in the history of computing (Nimda, 18 Sept 2001)

Security and the Internet ■ Lion Worm Ver 0.11 released March 29, 2001 Release of the Code-Red Worm July 19, 2001 Infected 359,000 computers in 14 hours At peak 2000 computers were being infected per minute Release of Nimda Worm on 18 September 2001 ■ Infected 160,000 at peak ■ within one day 450,000 unique IP addresses were attempting to spread the worm Leading to some of the most dangerous web server attacks ever known (18 September 2001)

- Gigger Worm JavaScript virus attacks Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Express and IRC
- Buffer overflow problems with Internet Explorer 5.01, 5.5 and 6.0 and IIS 4.5 and 5.1
- DOS problems in Microsoft's IIS 4.0, 5.0, 5.1, Cisco's ADSL routers, SNMPv1, and DNS Bind v9

Providing you are not using Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Express, Internet Explorer, IRC, SNMP Network Management, DNS Bind or any of Microsoft's web servers since IIS 4.0 - you should be OK!!

25 January, 2003 - SQL Server (Slammer) Worm

- Small MS SQL Worm (376 bytes) replicates itself using a buffer overflow technique.
- When worm gains control it generates random IP Address and send itself by connecting to remote UDP port 1434
- Large number of attempts leads to Denial of Service attack
- www.ravantivirus.com/virus/showvirus.php?v=164
- www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-04.html

- 16 July, 2003 Buffer Overflow in Windows RPC and XP Shell - Severity Rating: High
 - RPC Buffer overflow in RPC allows attacker to gain absolute control of a Windows machine!!
 - XP Buffer overflow allows attacker to execute code with logged-in user's privlidges!!
 - Both of these are severe and a rating of "high" has not been seen for over a year
 - www.watchguard.com/archive/images/lsglossary.htm#rpc

- 17 July, 2003 Denial of Service in all Cisco IOS Routers - Severity Rating: Critical
 - Critical DOS vulnerability which affects all Cisco IOS software running on all Cisco routers
 - By sending a specifically designed IPv4 packet to a router, all data can be blocked.
 - Although this attack is specific to IPv4 and not IPv6 most people are still running IPv4
 - This is a very significant and dangerous attack and a rating of "critical" has not been seen for over two years
 - www.watchguard.com/archive/images/lsglossary.htm#dos

- 11 August, 2003 Blaster Severity Rating: Critical
 - W32.Blaster.worm simple worm that exploits one of the worst Windows vulnerabilities in recent history
 - Utilised critical flaw reported on July 16 to create new blended attack
 - Does not even have to use e-mail to spread
 - Exploits DCOM (Microsoft's distributed object management tool) buffer overflow with TCP port 135 (Microsoft's RPC Location Service) to gain full control of machine
 - Uses TFTP to download msblast.exe and alters regisry settings to ensure it runs every time machine is rebooted

Case Examples of Buffer Overflow in recent months

Examples from both Windows and Unix/Linux

MS Blaster.Worm Buffer overflow in RPC / DCOM process
 CDialog
 XV
 Microsoft SQL
 LPC service

Case Study - Blaster

8 August, 2003 Major Corporate Network Disabled with Blaster (name withheld)

- All access to off-site web servers stopped 8 August. No apparent reason
- Numerous tests carried out over 4 hour period by disconnecting various parts of the corpotate intranet
- The Blaster worm was discovered but the patches had autodownloaded a few minutes too late
- Port 135 (as used by Microsoft Web Servers was disabled on all machines). Hence no services like windows updates
- Outage -10 hours
- Cost to repair \$30,000 (*excluing* time spent patching servers in user departments an lost productivity) 14

- 23 August, 2003 SoBig.F Severity Rating: Critical
 One of the most widespread viruses known
 - Crippled e-mail services. 57% of all e-mails infected on 21 August (21.6 of 38 million scanned by AOL that day)
 - Many large corpoates in Asia hit as well as international organisations such as Air Canada, CXS Corp. etc
 - Designed to turn computers into spam relay machines
 - Contained an encrypted file which has 20 key IP addresses to be used for large DDOS attack

Case Study - SoBig.F

23 August, 2003 Major Corporate Network Disabled with SoBig.F (name withheld)

- Microsoft patches applied to all servers but it was not clear why the patch only worked in some cases and no indication of the reason it did not stick
- Subsequently discovered that patch would only install correctly if cetain service packs were in place and backtracking on service packs often left a corrupted system file which stopped the blaster patch from working (see note)
 Microsoft released a patch for the patch!!
- EVERY machine in network had to be patched
- In mean time 20-40K e-mails per day had to be filtered
- Estimated cost to organisation \$25,000

- 26 January 2004 MyDoom email virus Severity Rating: High
 - 100 million infected e-mails in 36 hours
 - Mass mailing and peer-to-peer file sharing worm that drops copies of itself into windows system directory
 - Contains its own SMTP engine to construct outgoing messages
 - Contains a Denial of Service payload
 - Can generate random e-mail subjects, message bodies and attachment file names
 - contains executable attachments (22K zip file)

Watch this space - its not over yet!! 17

TCP/IP and the Internet

- TCP/IP was designed early in the 1980s when security was hardly an issue
- TCP/IP (version 4) therefore has virtually no security facilities, yet
- TCP/IP is today used in virtually every:
 local area, metropolitan, wide area, global network, and..
 application (conventional, voice, multimedia, etc ...)
 Scale of access (address, time) is unprecedented

Attack Incident Trends*


Organisations Reporting Incidents **1997 37%** ■ 1999 33% **2002** 67% ■ Where they attack Internal Systems - 28% Internet Access - 60% Remote Dial In - 18% ■ Other - 7%

* Source: 2002 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey

Factors Affecting Attack Trend


Increased use of the Internet
 Increasing software complexity
 Abundance of attack tools
 Increased use of broadband home access
 Slow adoption of good security practices

Rise of Attack Incidents




Rise in Incidents Reported to the CERT/CC - www.cert.org/stats (2004)

Rise of Attacks -Attack Sophistication vs Intruder Tech Knowledge




Howard Lipson. Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues. CERT Coordination Center. Nov. 2002

Types of Attack




Cost of Attack



Sabotage of Data Insider Abuse of Internal Systems Insider abuse of Email Unauthorised Access by Insider System Penetration by Outsider Laptop Theft Virus/Worm/trojan Infection Telecom Eavesdropping Wiretapping Heavy Scanning DoS Attack Telecommunications Fraud Financial Fraud

24


Attack Protection Systems



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Classification of Attack Methods

Social Engineering Persuading somebody to Hacking or Cracking Guess, corrupt or steal information Viruses and Worms Viruses - Melissa, AnnaKournikova, SoBig Worms - Lion, Ramen, Code-Red, Nimda, Blaster, MyDoom (2004) Trojan Horses Back Orifice, PKZIP3, SubSeven etc



Classification of Attack Methods Network Layer Attacks IP spoofing (masquerading) Sequence number prediction TCP hijacking




Classification of Attack Methods

(Distributed) Denial of Service Attacks

- Operating system attacks
 Ping of Death, Tear Drop, Land, Snork, Bonk ...
- Network attacks

■SYN flood, TCP fin/rst, Smurf, Coke

- Preventing DOS attacks
- Distributed DOS (DDOS) attacks



Threats to TCP/IP Services

Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) Telnet Network Time Protocol (NTP) Finger/Whois Network File System (NFS) File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) ActiveX Secure Shell (SSH) Domain Name Service (DNS) **NetBIOS** Server Message Block (SMB)

Social Engineering

Persuade someone to disclose sensitive information (eg Nigerian Letter Scam)

- Persuade someone to run/install malicious or subverted software
- Impersonating new employee who has forgotten userid/password
- Impersonating a technical support staff member and requesting a user login to 'check' accounts

Hacking and Cracking

- Password guessing or written down
- Default passwords (guest, manager)
- Password Cracking Tools, readily available from the Internet for a wide range of password protected systems: UNIX password files, Word documents, ZIP files, Windows password files, etc
- Complete set of attack tools at: "Church of the Swimming Elephant". www.cotse.com

Hacking and Cracking


Password Attacks

 Brute Force (for few characters) and Dictionary (for real-word password) attacks
 CRACK is available at: ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tools/crack
 Can often find 10% of passwords
 Demonstrates value of OTPs (One Time Passwords)

Hacking and Cracking


Packet Sniffers Sniffers can be legitimate tools - eg Microsoft's Protocol Analyser, Ethereal Difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate use Usually monitor all IP traffic Demonstrates value of OTPs

Virus, Worm ... Count Increasing




NOTE These figures include viruses, worms and other malicious code

Machines infected per hour at peak of outbreak



PC Infection Rate Increasing

Virus infections per 1,000 PCs per month



Source: ICSA 2002

Viruses, Worms and Network Propagation Systems

Viruses (Definition in "notes")

- Malicious program that spreads by infecting various files
- When infected file is opened, virus runs its program first and then opens the (now infected) file
- Most viruses spread by transferring infected file from one computer to another via e-mail attachments

Viruses Categories

File infection viruses

- attach themselves to .exe, .com, etc. (Many are DOS hangovers)
- Polymorphic viruses change their appearance each time an infected program is run

System or boot sector viruses

■infects executable code, eg DOS boot sector

Macro viruses

- infects Microsoft Word, eg Melissa (www.melissavirus.com)
- E-mail viruses usually carried by attachments

Virus Protection

Effective protection is anti-virus S/W which: scans e-mail attachments checks for virus signatures Examples: Norton (www.norton.com) McAfee (www.mcafee.com) Sophos (www.sophos.com) Most of these have versions which provide "push" technology and update a customer's site automatically

Viruses, Worms and Network Propagation Systems

Worms (Definition in "notes")

- Mass-Mailing Worms
 - do not infect files but propagate via file transfer (eg email attachments) which then release a virus upon opening (eg MyDoom, 2004)

Network-Aware Worms

- exploits security vulnerabilities such as unprotected shared drives, vulnerabilities in FTP etc usually by forcing a buffer overflow
- examples Ramen, Lion and Code-Red worms

Worm Protection

Mass mailing worms filter attachments and apply anti-virus software Network-aware worms application of patches to fix security holes Use of personal firewalls can assist Zone alarm, (www.zonelabs.com) Tiny firewall, (www.tinysoftware.com) SyGate (wwww.sygate.com) ■IPCop (Linux) (www.ipcop.com) Smoothwall (Linux) (www.smoothwall.org) Intrusion Detection System software

Lion Worm (29/3/2001)

Infects Redhat LINUX machines

- Attacks port 53 (DNS) and installs a trojan which e-mails the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files to huckit@china.com
- Then deletes /etc/hosts.deny lowering the security
- Protection: See

www.sans.org/y2k/lion_protection.htm, March 2001

Ramen Worm (17/1/2001)

- Infects Redhat LINUX 6.2 and 7 machines
- Attacks an RPC or ftpd service
- Patches available for current versions of LINUX
 Protection: See
 - www.securityfocus.com/archive/78/157627 (bugtraq)
 - www.symantec.com/avcentre/vinfodb.html (general)
 - http://service1.symantec.com/sarc/sarc.nsf/html/Linux.R amen.Worm.html (specific)

Code-Red Worm (19/7/2001)

- Infects all unprotected versions of Microsoft's IIS web server
- 359,000 machines attached in first 14 hours (peak infection rate was 2000/minute)
- Protection: See
 - www.securityfocus.com (bugtraq)
 - www.symantec.com/avcentre/vinfodb.html
 - www.caida.org/analysis/security/code-red

Nimda -The Mother of all Worms

('Admin' spelt backwards!)

- 18 September 2001
- Within 24 hrs -100,000's computers, 10,000's companies, 15 countries
- Generates own list of IPs then probes for IIS servers
- Utilised Code Red II worm affected machines
- Utilised 16 known vulnerabilities in Microsoft IIS
- Generates 16 HTML requests to non-patched IIS servers up to 13 times from each infected computer
- Modifies system files and registry keys
- Travels though shared drives and computers
- Creates administrator account on infected machine
- Attached to URL's infecting unsuspecting browsers⁴⁵

Case Study - Nimda Worm

- Attacks IIS servers that were not patched up to SPK6a (NT4) and SPK2 (Windows 2000)
- On our firewall we had 24,000 attempted connections at 2am and firewall failed (Automatic download of SophoS worm patch blocked)
- Once the worm reached the trusted network it infected IIS servers behind the firewall
- Attacks by issueing multiple "get" requests for files such as root.exe, cmd.exe, admin.dll
- Protection: See
 - www.securityfocus.com (bugtraq)
 - www.symantec.com/avcentre/vinfodb.html
 - www.caida.org/dynamic/analysis/security/nimda

Keeping Up-to-Date with Attacks ...

www.cert.org/advisories (main index by year) www.wildlist.org (virus spread data) www.securityfocus.com/news (bugtraq) www.symantec.com/avcentre/vinfodb.html www.caida.org/dynamic/analysis/security (analysis of propagation etc) www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp ?url=/technet/security/bulletin/ www.cotse.com "Church of the Swimming" Elephant", (source of attack tools for testing) .. estimated that only 34% of organisations admit to having been attacked (eg Nimda)

Computer Emergency Response Teams (certs)

www.apcert.org (Asia-Pacific) www.singcert.org.sg (Singapore) www.auscert.org.au (Australia) www.gcsb.govt.nz/ccip (New Zealand) www.hongkong.cert.org (Hong Kong) www.mycert.org.my (Malaysia) www.certcc.or.kr (Korea) www.cncert.org.cn (China) www.jpcert.or.jp/english (Japan) www.cert.org/advisories (US)

Viruses, Worms and Network Propagation Systems

Trojan Horses

- Installing a trojan horse program allows attacker to access user's machine remotely (via Internet)
- Often received as e-mail attachments
- Two components: client application, (runs on attacker's computer), and server application, (runs on victim's computer)

Trojan Horse contd

- Trojan Horses are distinct from viruses/worms. Do not infect files and have no means of propagation
- A Trojan Horse is program which pretends to be benign, but contains malicious code
- Normally waits to be downloaded or installed by a user - then its attack payload executes

Trojan Horse - Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K)

- Also call Netbus 1.2, 1.53, 1.60, 1.70, 2.0 ….
- Operates on all Windows machines
- Remote attacker can login, send, receive files
- Can re-route and defeat firewall configurations as it can operate on any port
- Very difficult to detect, filename can be made invisible
- Mobile version (Mobile BackOrifice) available
- Other examples include:
 - PKZIP 3, FTP, SubSeven
 - Attack FTP Installer, BackDoor, DeepBO, Executor, FTP99, Happy99

Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K)

Client machine can monitor and control a server: Execute any application on target machine Log keystrokes from target machine Restart target machine Lockup target machine View contents of any file on target machine Transfer files to and from target machine Display screen saver password of user on target Very vulnerable to attack without a firewall!

Other Trojan Horse Programs

PKZIP 3 Trojan

No real v3 PKZIP. This rogue version attempts to reformat the hard drive

Works by stealing reputation of another and making download freely available on the Internet

It was never available from www.pkware.com

Wuarchive FTPD Trojan

Nasty replacement for the widely used FTP daemon

Allows Trojan back door root access and privileged mode access

Other Trojan Horse Programs

SubSeven Server Trojan

- Similar to BO2K
- Machines can be infected by e-mail attachments containing the virus
- This Trojan was distributed under pretence of being an anti-virus program for detection of non-existent virus
- Modern versions of this Trojan have ability to command infected SubSeven servers from Internet Relay Chat channels, including initiating Ping flood DOS attacks
- Anti SubSeven Server is a protection and counterattack tool

Defence Against Trojan Horses

 Best defence is safe computing practices
 Use signature/checksum programs such as Tripwire (see under Intrusion Detection)
 Trojan Horses can come from unsolicited executable e-mail attachments from recognised senders, (resulting from a virus poaching that person's e-mail address book)

Defence Against Trojan Horses

 Virus-friendly applications, eg Outlook Express will often hide extensions of certain file types
 Famous example AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs attachment (13/2/01) appearing in Outlook Express to be the much more benign AnnaKournikova.jpg

Some e-mail programs will even automatically run received attachments to be helpful!!



Evolution of the Threat

Stage III Mass-Mailers and Worms Viruses Gain Complexity. Start to Take Over Machines and Steal Data. No Longer Needs Human Element to Spread

Stage II "Macro Era"

Stage I

"Floppy Era"

95 - 98 Virus Numbers Grow Rapidly. Viruses Spread Rapidly e.g. Macro Viruses via E-Mail

80's -94 Localised Impact e.g. Michelangelo

The New Trend - Blended Threats

Code Red for example:

- Hacking technique, with propulsion of a worm!
 - No user interaction required
 - No disk infection
 - Code Red sits in memory and sneaks across the Internet on the back of HTTP communications between MS web-servers

Watch for 'copy-cat' variants eg Blaster (August 2003) was a variation on a Windows **RPC Buffer Overflow released a month earlier** (July 2003)

The New Trend - Blended Threats

- Worms that drop parasitic viruses
- Destructive Trojans
- Password stealers
- RATs (Remote Access Trojans)
- Trojanised applications which replace legitimate system tools
- Multiplatform attacks (payloads affecting multiple platforms), eg Linux worms that drop.exe Trojans
-further blending of worms + viruses + Trojans

Blended Threats - Recent Example

Bugbear (W32/Bugbear@MM) - Sept 30, 2002

Blended threat worm - very nasty!

- Uses multiple infection paths, disables antivirus and firewall software, and exploits IE vulnerabilities
- Can also install backdoor Trojan and keylogger

Buffer Overflow - Common Attack Method

- Technique used to gain remote execution on host
- Takes advantage of inadequate vetting of integrity of incoming TCP/IP packets
- Often involves overwriting return addresses on the stack
- Involves sending executable code as binary data within an attack packet, usually carefully crafted to be located at specific position within packet
- May be complicated by the need to encode the packet, eg Base64, uuencode


Question - Why does an operating system not check for buffer overflows?

- Answer In many cases it does. For example when a user logs in various checks are made
- The problem occurs when rogue (attack) packets arrive after all checking has been carried out
- Question why not check every field of every packet everywhere in the system?

Answer - !!!!!!



- In previous slide Parameter1 and Parameter2 are fields obtained from (rogue) packet and placed in stack. Parameter1 overflows fields & return address
- The return address becomes X"41414141" which causes a crash = DOS attack
- In following slide an alternative attack causes the return address (12345678) to Call the ECX register which points to some nasty code in the rogue packet
- Either way DOS is achieved
- Common problem with RPC ports where both ends are already trusted and authenticated but rogue packets enter network (eg with spoofed IP addresses - to follow)




How can this happen if client is authenticated and where both ends are already trusted?

Rogue packets enter network (eg with spoofed IP address)

Common problem with RPC ports (for example)

Network Layer Attacks

IP Spoofing (Masquerading)
 TCP Session Hijacking
 TCP Sequence Number Attack



Threats to TCP/IP

IP Spoofing
 TCP Sequence Number Attack
 TCP Session Hijacking

Often combined

All exploit weaknesses in TCP/IP and source code freely available on the Internet



IP Spoofing

IP packet header (Version 4) vulnerable to attack
 Christmas Day attack - source IP address forged
 Source routed packets vulnerable to IP header tampering

Easy for *internal* attackers

32 bits				
Version IHL	Type of service	Total leng n		
Ident	fication	D M F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F		
Time to live/ Hop Count	Protocol	Header checksum		
	Source address			
Destination address				
Options				

IP Spoofing

- Attacker impersonates host at IP layer by forging source address using RAW-socket. This feature now available in Windows XP!
- Commonly used to launch SYN flood attacks, ICMP redirects, and ping flooding
- Target host has no way of knowing IP address has been spoofed
- DNS spoofing works by returning incorrect address
- IP spoofing combines with TCP seq. number attack ...

Spoofing an IP Packet

Ref: http://gsproof.sourceforge.net/screenshots

🔀 🖼 🛛 Gspoof - < TCP/IP Packet Forg	ger v. 2.1 >-	· · •
ETHERNET OPTIONS (Link Layer)	IP OPTIONS (Network Layer)	TCP OPTIONS (Transport Layer)
Interface eth0	Src addr 192.168.1.2	Src port 1024
		Dst port 23
Src MAC 0:40:D0:1E:26:F4	Dst addr 192.168.1.32	FURG ⊒RST FLAGS ⊒ACK ⊒SYN
Dst MAC 0:39:2E:CC:01:24	TTL 128	F PSH FIN SEQ number 252781489
	ID 16365	ACK number 1024294309
ЕТН Туре IP	TOS 8	Window Size 32767
lr	nject Data (put a string in TCP payle	URG Pointer 1024 pad)
SEND	Enable Link-Layer Operations	Send Multi-Packets
RESET	CREDITS KILLME	Break(ms) Lenght(s) 100 2
** Packet has been correctly send (to		

Threats to TCP/IP

IP Spoofing
 TCP Sequence Number Attack
 TCP Session Hijacking

Often combined

All exploit weaknesses in TCP/IP and source code freely available on the Internet





 TCP sequence number prediction takes advantage of TCP's sequenced data delivery
 If attacker determines correct sequence number then they can generate own TCP segments
 Two methods:

 attack TCP handshake (TCP (IP) spoofing)
 take over legitimate session (TCP hijacking)

	host (client)	TCP flags	host (server)	
step 1	A •	- SYN	► B	
step 2	A ← - S	SYN / ACK <mark></mark>	- B	
step 3	A	– ACK – – –	► B	
step 4	A	- Data	▶ В ∕	repeated
		and / or		repeated during data
	A 🗲	· Data <mark></mark> ·	- в 🗸	transfer

Can Attack TCP Handshake or Data Transfer





- Attacker must ensure spoofed host is unreachable, otherwise it will receive SYN/ACK and issue RST to defeat attack
- Attacker must therefore
 - 1. wait until spoofed host off-line or
 - 2. take it offline with denial of service attack (eg SYN flood)
- Non-Blind Spoofing
 - easy attacker on same LAN segment as target host
 - can use protocol analyser for direct access to IP packets and TCP sequence numbers

Blind Spoofing

- attacker on different LAN segment from target host
 must guess initial TCP sequence number based upon operating system. Three ways -
- 1. 64K rule used in older OSs (eg OSF, SunOS)
- 2. time related generation of sequence numbers
- 3. pseudo-random generation of sequence numbers
- prediction almost impossible with 2 and 3

- Blind Spoof can be turned into Non-blind Spoof by using source routed IP packets or affecting routing tables en route
- Source routed packets allow return route to be specified in IP packet header which can be spoofed by attacker

Therefore very important to drop source routed IP packets - especially if they originate from an untrusted network

Threats to TCP/IP

IP Spoofing
 TCP Sequence Number Attack
 TCP Session Hijacking

Often combined

All exploit weaknesses in TCP/IP and source code freely available on the Internet




	host (client)	TCP flags	host (server)	
step 1	A	– SYN – – -	•► B	
step 2	A ← - S	SYN/ACK <mark></mark>	- B	
step 3	A	– ACK – – -	•► B	
step 4	A	- Data	► B (repeated
		and / or		repeated during data transfer
	A ←	Data <mark></mark>	- B	Iransfer


Can Attack TCP Handshake or Data Transfer

TCP Session Hijacking

- TCP session hijacking used in conjunction with IP spoofing and TCP sequence number attack Can be used to take over TCP applications like Telnet, FTP, rlogin
- Once attacker has TCP segment sequence they can take over connection

All packets then sent by hijacked (spoofed) host will be ignored by target host as sequence numbers will be incorrect





TCP Session Hijacking – counter-measures

TCP session hijacking can circumvent one-time passwords and is smarter than simple sniffing

- ISPs can help by blocking all IP packets with source addresses which originate from outside the domain (spoofed addresses)
- Trusted hosts (eg .rhosts) should only be used with authentication and encryption
- Correctly configure firewall

Denial of Service Attacks

Intention is not to gain illegal access but to make network services unavailable to users Sometimes called nuke attack Flooding attacks overload server Examples include: - Ping o' Death, SYN Flood, ICMP redirect messages No real solution but sharing services across different servers and using a properly configured firewall can assist

(Distributed) Denial of Service Attacks

Distributed DOS attack requires coordination from multiple sites Two categories: Operating System Attacks - exploit known weakness and vulnerabilities Network Attacks - exploit limitations of network resources, eg flooding http://packetstormsecurity.org has plenty of attack tools available for download!!

Normal TCP Connection Set-up

TCP SYN-ACK Sequence

"May I have a connection?




'll set aside one just for you

"Great, I'll take it"

Abnormal TCP Connection Set-up

TCP SYN-ACK Sequence



Connection Setup Incomplete


Bringing a major web site to its knees

More than a lone user on a modem

Need hundreds of sites working together or thousands of users

Internet Bandwidth


Processing Power



Over time, other requests will not be serviced
 System locks up, does not really die - just impaired

Distributed DOS Attack

Multiple users are difficult to co-ordinate and can be traced
 Better to use hijack intermediate sites



DOS Attack Classification

Operating System **Attacks** ActiveX/Pentium III Bonk/Boink Jolt Land NestEA ■NT inetinfo

■NT MsgBox ■NT Stop ■Oshare ■ Out of Band (OOB) Ping of Death ■Snork Tear Drop Win/Arp/Poink

Ping o' Death DOS Attack Tests for host by using ICMP packet Ping data payload can be 64K bytes Possible to create (offset + size) > 64K ping -I 65510 (buffer size) ip# will launch attack This can cause overflows, system crashes, reboots, kernel dumps etc Patched in most systems Block fragmented pings (eg 64-byte pings only)

Tear Drop Attack

- Attacker sends overlapping packets to victim
 When victim machine attempts to re-construct packets it hangs
 Bonk Attack does same thing by sending corrupted
 - UDP packets to port 53 (DNS)
- Affects unpatched machines

Land Attack

- Attacker sends spoofed packet(s) with the SYN flag set to any open port that is listening on victim's machine
- Packet(s) contain same destination and source IP address as the host
- Victim's machine hangs or reboots

Systems can freeze, where CTL-ALT-DEL fails to work, mouse and keyboard become nonoperational 96

Other OS-based DOS Attacks

Snork

overload of CPU with continuous bounce attack

WinArp/Poink

overload with spoofed ARP packets

NT Stop

invalid SMB block size

ActiveX/Pentium III

hostile code in web pages causing the "Blue screen of death"

Jolt

spoofed and fragmented ICMP packets which cannot be reassembled

DOS Attack Classification

Network Attacks ■Smack/Bloop ■Smurf SYN Floods ■TCP FIN/RST bit Winfreez ■+++ATHZero

Smurf Attack

ICMP echo (pings) sent to broadcast addresses

- Source address is spoofed and is that of the victim
- Potentially every host can reply to each broadcast
- For *n* hosts and *m* broadcasts then victim receives *n x m* responses


SYN Flooding

Server receives more incomplete connection requests than it can handle Source code published on Internet Prevents completion of 3-way TCP handshake by withholding ACK flag

3-way handshake SYN SYN/ACK ACK

SYN Flooding

- Number of half open connections limited
 Server rejects subsequent requests until existing requests time out → 75 secs creating denial of service
- Attacking host must spoof source IP address to routable but unreachable host
- Randomisation of (unreachable) source address assists in hiding attacker's location



SYN Flooding – counter-measures

- ISPs can block IP packets with non-internal addresses from reaching the Internet
- Intrusion detection tools
- Modifications to operating system eg increase size of backlog queue, randomly drop half-open connections

TCP RST and FIN DOS Attacks

TCP - control flags for segment status RST (resets connection) and FIN (finish of data) can be used for DOS attacks ■ If RST or FIN contain correct sequence # they will be accepted (no ACK reqd) Protocol analyser used to determine sequence numbers between spoofed and target hosts

3-way handshake SYN SYN/ACK

ACK

TCP RST and FIN DOS Attacks

Generate TCP segment with RST flag set + correct sequence number and placed in spoofed IP packet then connection closed ■ FIN flag can be used in same way Any further TCP segments sent from spoofed to target host are ignored RST and FIN attacks only possible on internal **TCP** networks

Other Network-based DOS Attacks

Coke

garbage attack on WINS - fills the log!

Click

Flood with ICMP unreachable error messages causing connection termination

Smack/Bloop

Similar to Click but without connection termination

Winfreez

Spoofed ICMP packets causing routing table corruption

+++ATHZero

attack to terminate connection to Hayes modem 106

Some DDOS Tools

- Trin00 (Trinity 2000)
 - co-ordinated UDP flood attacks from multiple sources

TFN (Tribal Flood Network)


similar to Trin00 but can also launch TCP SYN flood, ICMP echo request and ICMP broadcast attacks

Stachedraht [= barb wire in German]

- combines features of Trin00 + TFN + encryption of traffic between attacker, masters and agents components)
- TFN2K (Windows + UNIX are vulnerable)
 combination of above with more sophisticated features

Case Studies of DOS Attacks

- eBay, Amazon, CNN, Yahoo,
 E*Trade, all hit 7-11Feb 2000 up to three hours of sustained
 attack and sites unreachable
 DOS attack on *all* Cisco Router
 - IOSs (July 2003). Critical attack blocking *all* traffic on *all* routers
- Major impact for those companies who depend on the network for their livelihood



Preventing DOS Attacks

- DOS attacks are very difficult to prevent
 Important that DOS staging points not available
 DOS attack S/W available on the Internet much of it has sophisticated capabilities and thousands of launching sites may be harnessed
 Tools can completely remove themselves and
 - provide cover
- Encryption is used between components to prevent detection (Stachedraht + TFN2K)

Preventing DOS Attacks

Secure all servers

protects against attack and as a relay point

Distribute load across multiple servers

- Machines with E1/E3 and other high speed access are at high risk
- Good packet filtering at firewall
- Disable Directed Broadcasts
 - protects against Smurf attacks
- Get ISP to implement ingress filtering services

Some Specific DOS Attack Prevention Measures

- Configure gateway routers for *egress filtering* prevents spoofed traffic from exiting network
 Use firewall with application proxies, which should
- block all TFN2K traffic + *new tracking methods*
- Disallow unnecessary ICMP, TCP, and UDP traffic
- Disallow UDP and TCP except on a specific ports
- Remain current with security-related patches to operating systems and applications software
- Regularly scan network file systems for evidence of infection by DOS tools

Threats to TCP/IP Services

- Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP)
 Telnet
- Network Time Protocol (NTP)
- Finger/Whois
- Network File System (NFS)
- File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
- ActiveX
- Secure Shell (SSH)
- Domain Name Service (DNS)
- NetBIOS
- Server Message Block (SMB)



Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) - Port 25

E-mail is most popular Internet application

- Original problems centred on sendmail and Internet worm and......
- Denial of Service Threats:
 - E-mail flooding
 - Large messages or attachments (>1 Mbyte)
- Information Gathering:

VRFY command can translate mail alias to login
 CRACK can then be used

SMTP - Port 25 ... Case Study

Some recent statistics relating to SoBig.F (August 2003). Organisation X

Filters for:

- ■Unsafe attachments \rightarrow 80K per day dumped
- ■Viruses $\int = 1 \text{ per second } (24 \times 7)$

■Blackhole List \rightarrow 20-40K per day dumped

PreciseMail Anti-Spam Gateway had a discard rate of over 50% of all e-mail (cf AOL statistics of 57% during peak of SoBig.F)

You must pay for the mail you don't want! ¹¹⁴

Spam and Mail Relay Attacks PreciseMail Anti-Spam Gateway (SoBig.F) (www.process.com/precisemail/precisemailds.htm) SpamAssassin (http://spamassassin.org) MailMarshal and WebMarshal (www.marshalsoftware.com) ■GFI Mail Security (www.mailessentials.com) Spam Tester (www.dnsstuff.com) Mail abuse prevention system (www.mailabuse.org)

Additional filters for junk mail include:

- RBL Realtime Blackhole List addresses of ISPs who are know to be sources of spam mail
- DUL Dailup User List addresses of spammers who attempt direct connection to mail servers rather than using ISPs mail server
- RSS Relay Spam Stopper addresses of ISPs who allow themselves to be used as a mail relay

Spam and Mail Relay Attacks

Firewall proxy needs to be configured to:

- (allowed to:) block incoming traffic posing as an insider, eg administrator@silverfire.com coming from outside
- (denied from:) block outgoing access where source is not@silverfire.com (relaying spam mail)

Question.....

- Suppose that the manager wants to be a roaming client. How can they be provided with access?
 - Build a tunnel and use PPTP/IPSec encryption allocating an IP number from the firewall for the internal network
 - Set up the "allowed to" and "denied from" proxy rules as discussed - which will block the manager!!
 - Set up another rule which allows access to the e-mail server from a specified IP address (managers PC)
 - Question which rule takes precedence?
 - Does the second rule override the first?

Telnet - Port 23

Simple and widely used host independent character-based terminal access protocol
 Threats:

 ID and password capture during login
 Packet sniffer can easily detect Telnet session
 Telnet program itself can be compromised to

record IDs and passwords

Some secure versions of Telnet encrypt passwords and message contents

Network Time Protocol (NTP) - Port 123

- Used to synchronise host clocks on the Internet
 Threats:

 Altering clocks
 - If successful this can affect a time-based authentication protocol by enabling replaying of previous successful authentication sequences
 - Can confuse time-based backups
- Newer versions of NTP provide cryptographic message authentication and/or control time offsets (Version 3)

Finger and Whois - Ports 79 & 43

Provides information on host users (account names, login audit, signature file etc)

Threats:

- Can be used to collect useful information on account names, login profiles etc
- Can provide valuable information for use with CRACK
- Finger Bomb can be used for Denial of Service attacks, eg finger username@@@@@hostA (recursive)
- Finger chaining, eg finger username@hosta@hostb
- Newer versions of finger fix some problems

Network File System (NFS) - Port 111 (Sun RPC)

Provides transparent remote access to shared files across network and portability achieved with RPCs

Threats:

 Files and directories are identified by unique strings -"handles". Attacker may get root file handle
 Attacker can then change access controls
 Trapdoor programs can then be planted
 Encryption and authentication are necessary ¹²²

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) - Ports 20 (data) and 21 (control)

Very useful binary and character-based file transfer protocol used on most architectures

Threats:

- Like Telnet, FTP does not encrypt IDs and passwords
- Running public (anonymous) FTP services
- If access controls are circumvented then file permissions can be changed, trapdoors inserted etc
- Can be combined with IP spoofing to create "FTP Bounce Attack"
- Mandates careful use of file permissions as well as encryption and authentication
 123

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) - Port 80

- Four categories of web security threats:
 - alteration of web site data weakly secured web servers can be compromised by attackers and the web site data defaced or destroyed (US Air Force, CIA, Justice Dept, Universal Studios)
 - access to web server OS malicious code can cause buffer overflow and exceptional conditions which give access to the OS. Commands can be embedded in web requests which in turn pass to the OS
 - eavesdropping on browser-server traffic
 - impersonation of another web server (see DNS) ¹²⁴

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) - Port 80

- Use of Secure-HTTP (SHTTP) in conjunction with SSL/TLS allows client-servers to negotiate security levels for particular transactions
- Most ActiveX and Java applets can be digitally signed (digital certificate)
- Recent versions of browsers ensure that Java and ActiveX executables have no access to system resources

Active X and Java Applets

- Can pass harmful programs across network and execute them through user's browser These attacks differ from other applicationlayer attacks in two main respects: They are initiated not by the attacker but by the user via web page request Attacks are not restricted to specific hardware
 - platforms and operating systems because of software portability

Domains Name Server (DNS) - Port 53

Potential for DNS attacks are great, but rare DNS system is vulnerable to DOS attacks Mirroring DNS sites increases functionality but also vulnerability to spoofing attacks ■ DNSSEC (DNS Secure) - extension of DNS, prevents spoofing attacks by allowing websites to verify their domain names and IP addresses using digital signatures and public-127 key encryption

Server Message Block (SMB) - Ports 137, 138, 139

- SMB provides file read/write and service requests in Microsoft windows networks
- Clients connect to servers via NetBIOS over TCP/IP
- Clients can send commands (SMBs) to the server that allow them to look up names, access shares, open files, read and write files over the network!!

This multi-port, multi-protocol service rule opens:
 port 137 (UDP) for nbname service
 port 138 (UDP) for nbdatagram service

port 139 (TCP) for nbsession service

For secure configuration, SMB operates over a₂₈VPN

Summary

- TCP/IP networks are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks - from password sniffing to denial of service
- Most attack software can be downloaded from the Internet
- Essential to understand common attack methods -SYN Flooding, IP Spoofing, Denial of Service, TCP Session Hijacking etc
- A properly configured firewall with both TCP/UDP/IP port and application filtering is essential
- Cryptographic, authentication and certification services are becoming mandatory